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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. section 78-2-2 (3)(j) (Supp. 1994). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly hold that the court lacked 
specific personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to Rule 12 
(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When an issue involving specific personal jurisdiction is 
decided on documentary evidence the standard of review is a 
correction of error standard. Arcruello v. Industrial Woodworking 
Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992). Anderson v. American 
Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 
(Utah 1990), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 276 (1991). See also 
Kamdar & Company v. Laray Company, Inc., 815 P.2d 245 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1991) . 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-22 (1992). (See Appendix 1). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-23 (1992). (See Appendix 2). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-24 (Supp. 1994). (See Appendix 
3) . 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(2). (See Appendix 4). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a case involving an alleged breach of a personal 
guarantee. 
B. Proceedings Below. 
Plaintiff filed his complaint in the Fourth District Court 
on November 22, 1993. (R. at 13-1). Defendant was served on 
December 7, 1993 in the State of Colorado. (R. at 14) . Defendant 
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on 
March 4, 1994. (R. at 18-17). There was no oral argument. The 
court entered a memorandum decision granting Defendant's motion 
on April 26, 1994. (R. at 166-163). The order of dismissal was 
entered on May 20, 1994. (R. at 170-169). 
A notice of appeal was filed on June 20, 1994. This case 
was poured over from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals on 
September 21, 1994 (R. at 178) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The original promissory note in this matter for $101,500 was 
assigned to plaintiff on June 24, 1975. (R. at 12). On the 
25th of September, 1975 defendant personally guaranteed the note 
and agreed to pay an additional 1% interest in exchange for an 
agreement to waive certain prior security agreements. (R. at 5-
4, 12) . 
The September 25, 1975 guarantee was finalized by 
defendant's signature in Colorado. (R. at 5-4). Plaintiff later 
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acknowledged receipt of the guarantee. Defendant signed the 
agreement in Colorado, and all previous agreements were signed in 
Colorado. The agreement does not mention performance anywhere 
outside the State of Colorado. 
Plaintiff brought this action to compel payment of balances 
which he claims are due under the note and personal guarantee. 
(R. at 12) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The standard of review in cases where specific personal 
jurisdiction is at issue depends on how the case was decided in 
the trial court. The case at bar was decided based on the 
complaint and the exhibits which accompanied it. No affidavits 
were ever offered by either side. The standard of review is 
therefore a correction of error standard. 
The complaint contains a single statement which would go to 
specific personal jurisdiction. The statement is found in 
paragraph 3 of the complaint which states: "the agreements which 
are the subject of this action were entered into and are intended 
to be performed in the State of Utah." (R. at 13). Where 
documents alone are used for determining jurisdiction, only a 
prima facie demonstration of jurisdiction is required. 
The statement above is not sufficient to make the required 
prima facie demonstration when considered in light of the 
documents which were attached to the Complaint as exhibits. 
These exhibits include the personal guarantee which is the 
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subject of this action. Examination of the documents clearly 
demonstrates that there is no expressed or implied place of 
performance outside the state of Colorado. 
When specific personal jurisdiction is being examined there 
are two points which must be satisfied. The first requirement is 
that the defendant have performed some act within the State of 
Utah which is enumerated in the Long Arm Statute. The second 
requirement is that the defendant's contacts with Utah be 
sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be exercised without 
violating the due process rights of the defendant. The plaintiff 
has clearly failed to plead sufficiently to satisfy either the 
Long Arm Statute or due process in the complaint and attached 
document. Plaintiff has failed to plead the required nexus 
between the defendant, the cause of action, and the forum. He 
has also failed to plead regarding how maintenance of this action 
in Utah will not violate the due process rights of the defendant. 
Plaintiff argues in his brief that approximately 115 pages 
of alleged correspondence between the parties should be 
considered in determining whether specific personal jurisdiction 
exists. The documents are not self authenticating, and are not 
supported by an affidavit. They therefore have no evidentiary 
value and should not be considered. 
Even if the correspondence were considered in determining 
whether jurisdiction was proper, it does not demonstrate that 
defendant transacted business in Utah as required under the Long 
Arm Statute. (If anything, the correspondence would go to 
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whether defendant was doing business in Utah. In his brief, 
plaintiff indicates that he is not claiming that defendant was 
doing business. Brief of Appellant at 7). Plaintiff's complaint 
also fails to demonstrate that there is a nexus between the 
defendant, the forum and the litigation, and that defendant's due 
process rights will not be violated . 
Even if the court were to find that defendant had transacted 
business in Utah, there is no demonstration nor pleading 
regarding due process. Without pleading that due process will be 
satisfied, plaintiff's complaint against a resident of another 
state cannot stand. The trial court must therefore be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Standard of review in cases where a trial court has 
granted a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is 
dependent on how the trial court has handled the motion. If 
there was an evidentiary hearing held, it is a clearly erroneous 
standard. If, as here, the case is decided on documentary 
evidence, it is a correction of error standard. Arcruello v 
Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992) . 
Anderson v. American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive 
Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 
276 (1991). See also Kamdar & Company vs Laray Company, Inc., 
815 P.2d 245 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
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II. ISSUE FOR REVIEW: 
The plaintiff in the case at bar has appealed, and has 
briefed a single issue. The issue is whether the trial court has 
specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 1 In 
determining whether specific personal jurisdiction exists, trial 
courts have several options for determining jurisdiction. In 
Anderson v. American Soc. of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827 
(Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the approach used by 
the Federal Courts. 
In the federal trial court's discretion, under rule 12 it 
may determine jurisdiction on affidavits alone, permit 
discovery, or hold an evidentiary hearing. If it proceeds 
on documentary evidence alone (ie the first two methods), 
the plaintiff is only required to make a prima facie showing 
of personal jurisdiction. 
Anderson, at 827. 
1
. In the case at bar, the only issue before the court is 
whether the trial court had specific personal jurisdiction over the 
defendant. (See plaintiff's brief at 7) At the trial level the 
defendant seemed to be mixing the analysis of general personal 
jurisdiction and specific personal jurisdiction. The confusion 
comes because for a time, Utah courts blurred the distinction 
between general personal jurisdiction and specific . personal 
jurisdiction. In Abbott G.M. Diesel v. Piper Aircraft, 578 P.2d 
850 (Utah 1978) the Utah Supreme Court distinguished between 
"general" personal jurisdiction and "specific" personal 
jurisdiction. Essentially, general jurisdiction is the 
jurisdiction used in a "doing business statute." Specific personal 
jurisdiction is the kind of jurisdiction examined when a minimum 
contacts test is applied. 
Where a defendant's forum-state activity is 
extensive, the forum may assert personal jurisdiction in 
either related or unrelated claims (doing business 
concept). Where the defendant has only minimum contacts 
with the forum, personal jurisdiction may be asserted 
only on claims arising out of the defendant's forum-state 
activity, (long arm or transaction of business concept.) . 
Nova Mud Corporation, v. L. H. Fletcher, 64 8 F. Supp. 
1123 (U.S. Dist. Ct. District of Utah Central Division). 
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In the case at bar, the trial court decided the matter based 
exclusively on documentary evidence. The only documents before 
the court were the complaint and the documents attached to it as 
exhibits. (In its response to defendant's motion to dismiss, 
plaintiff included numerous documents. These documents were not 
in affidavit form, and were not authenticated in any way.) In 
considering plaintiff's appeal, the only documents which are 
before the court are the complaint and the documents attached as 
exhibits. 
III. PLAINTIFF'S PLEADINGS DO NOT ESTABLISH A PFTMA FACIE 
DEMONSTRATION OF JURISDICTION. 
The allegations regarding jurisdiction which are in 
plaintiff's complaint are contained in the first five paragraphs 
of the Complaint. (R. at 13). Those paragraphs are as follows: 
1. Plaintiff is an individual residing in Utah County. 
2. Defendant is an individual residing in the State of 
Colorado. 
3. The agreements which are the subject of this action 
were entered into and intended to be performed in the 
State of Utah. 
4. The amount in controversy is in excess of $20,000.00. 
5. Jurisdiction and venue are proper before this court. 
(R. at 12) . 
The remaining allegations of the complaint do not address 
jurisdiction. 
In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that where 
jurisdiction is being decided on the basis of documents alone, 
plaintiff must make only a "prima facie showing of personal 
jurisdiction." Anderson, at 827. Because neither side submitted 
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affidavits, the facts within the complaint and the accompanying 
exhibits must be considered. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part inquiry to 
determine whether Utah courts have personal jurisdiction over 
nonresidents. Kamdar & Company v. Boal, 815 P.2d 245, 165 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 9 (1991) . Anderson v. American Soc. of Plastic 
Surgeons. 148 Utah Adv. Rep 3 (Utah 1990). Bradford v. Nagle, 
763 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1988). The first part of the inquiry 
requires that, claims must arise from one of the activities 
enumerated in the Utah long-arm statute. The second inquiry 
requires that: "the defendant's contacts with Utah must be 
sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be exercised without 
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution." Kamdar, at 245. These 
notions are set forth in detail in Arguello v. Industrial 
Woodworking Machine Co., where the court stated: 
Generally, whether a state can exercise specific personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is determined by 
two factors: the breadth of the forum state's 
jurisdictional statute and the due process limitations on 
jurisdiction imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. See Parry v. Ernst Home Center 
Corp., 779 P.2d 659, 661 (Utah 1989); Bradford V. Nagle, 
763 P.2d 791, 793 (Utah 1988). If the relevant state 
statute does not permit jurisdiction, then the inquiry is 
ended; if it does, then the question is whether the 
statute's reach comports with due process. Bradford, 763 
P.2d at 793 (quoting 2 James W. Moore, Moore's Federal 
Practice, P. 4.41-1[4], at 4-335 to -336 (2d ed. 1988)). 
Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 
(Utah 1992) . 
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In applying the principles set forth above to the facts of 
the case at bar, the first inquiry which this court must make to 
determine whether jurisdiction is proper is whether the 
activities of the defendant fall within the breadth of the long 
arm statute. The pertinent portion of the long arm statute is 
found in U.C.A. 78-27-24 (1953 as amended). 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or 
not a citizen or resident of this state, who in person or 
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, 
submits himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this 
state as to any claim arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; . . . 
Utah law provides a definition of "transaction of business 
within this state." UCA 78-27-23 states in pertinent part: (2) 
"The words 'transaction of business within this state' mean 
activities of a nonresident person, his agents, or 
representatives in this state which affect persons or businesses 
within the state of Utah." 
In construing the above statute, what is examined is whether 
a nexus exists between the plaintiff's claim and the defendant's 
conduct within the state of Utah. For personal jurisdiction to 
exist, Utah law requires that the conduct complained of by 
Plaintiff arises out of defendant's contact with the state. 
IV. THE EXHIBITS ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE 
AGREEMENT WAS TO BE PERFORMED IN COLORADO. 
Examination of the complaint and the accompanying exhibits 
makes it clear that the "transaction of any business" requirement 
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of the long arm statute has not been met. Paragraph 2 of the 
complaint indicates that defendant is a resident of the State of 
Colorado. Paragraph 3 of the complaint indicates that "the 
agreements which are the subject of this action were entered into 
and are intended to be performed in the State of Utah." (R. at 
13). The balance of the numbered paragraphs of the complaint 
contain the amount in controversy, a statement concluding that 
jurisdiction and venue are proper, and a description of the 
history of the transactions which allegedly took place between 
the parties. 
On page 8 of Appellant's Brief, plaintiff argues that 
paragraph 3 of the complaint is sufficient standing alone to 
establish that defendant transacted business in the State of Utah 
sufficient to establish jurisdiction under the long arm statute. 
Plaintiff's argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, 
paragraph 3 is not pleading a fact, it is a legal conclusion. 
Secondly, paragraph 3 does not stand alone. In addition to 
filing a complaint, the plaintiff in this matter filed several 
exhibits as part of the complaint. (R. at 10-1). Examination of 
the exhibits makes it plain that the conclusion in paragraph 3 is 
incorrect and that the agreements were entered into in the State 
of Colorado and were intended to be performed in the State of 
Colorado. 
Exhibit number 1 of plaintiff's complaint is the original 
promissory note which lies at the heart of this matter. (R. at 
10). The note says "Denver Colorado" at the top. Review of the 
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note reveals that it is secured by real property located in the 
State of Colorado. (R. at 9). 
Exhibit number 2 of plaintiff's complaint is the assignment 
of the note to the defendant. (R. at 7). The assignment was 
notarized in Colorado. 
Exhibit number 3 of plaintiff's complaint is the assignment 
to plaintiff notarized in Denver, Colorado. 
Exhibit number 4 of plaintiff's complaint is a letter which 
defendant allegedly sent to plaintiff. This letter appears to 
discuss terms of the personal guarantee. (R. at 5). It was 
signed by defendant in the State of Colorado. The contents of 
the letter, however, were "noted and acknowledged" by plaintiffs 
in Utah. 
The final two exhibits of plaintiff's complaint were both 
signed by defendant in the State of Colorado, and consist of 
letters which accompanied payments pursuant to the personal 
guarantee. (R. at 3-1). 
None of the documents indicate in any way that they are to 
be performed in the State of Utah. The closest arguable 
connection with Utah is the signature of plaintiff on exhibit 
number 4. This signature is not helpful to plaintiff because it 
is the conduct of defendant rather than plaintiff which is 
examined in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists. In 
making this determination courts must analyze the relationship of 
the defendant, the forum and the litigation to each other. 
Mallory Encrineerincr v. Ted R. Brown & Associates, 618 P.2d 1004, 
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1007 (1980). The exhibits clearly demonstrate that the defendant 
executed the agreements in Colorado. 
Plaintiff may attempt to argue that defendant having 
contracted with a Utah resident is sufficient to invoke 
jurisdiction. The Utah Federal Court has decided this exact 
issue. In STV International Marketing v. Cannondale Corp., 750 
F. Supp 1070, 1077 (D. Utah 1990), the court held: 
The nexus requirement is not met whenever there is creation 
or breach of a contract with a Utah plaintiff. Nor would 
the circumstance of presence in Utah by way of 
correspondence and telephone calls, without more necessarily 
be sufficient to satisfy nexus. 
STV, at 1077. 
Plaintiff may also argue that mailing exhibits 5 and 6 to 
Utah is sufficient to create jurisdiction under the Long Arm 
Statute. Simply placing an executed agreement in the mail is not 
sufficient to invoke jurisdiction. STV International Marketing 
v. Cannondale Corp., 750 F. Supp 1070. 1077 (D. Utah 1990). 
In analyzing the complaint and the accompanying documents it 
is evident that the requirements of the long arm statute have not 
been pled. Where the requirements of the statute are not met, no 
further inquiry is necessary. Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking 
Machine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992). 
V. PLAINTIFF'S ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS FAIL TO ESTABLISH 
JURISDICTION. 
Because the complaint and the supporting exhibits fail to 
satisfy the requirements of the long arm statute, defendant in 
his Motion to Dismiss in the trial court did not file affidavits 
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or other documents. (R. at 24) . Along with his Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, plaintiff filed 
approximately 115 pages of correspondence as exhibits. These 
documents appear to consist primarily of letters which 
accompanied payments on the personal guarantee. The letters were 
sent over the course of at least 15 years by defendant to 
plaintiff and his wife who were friends of defendant. (R. at 
135-29). None of the documents are supported by affidavits, nor 
are they authenticated in any way. 
In Appellant's Brief, plaintiff argues that although the 
exhibits were not affirmed by affidavit, they should be accepted 
because there was no objection to the exhibits. Plaintiff 
further argues that because there was no objection, the 
evidentiary defects were waived. 
Plaintiff's arguments are in error. Defendant's responded 
to the these documents by indicating that they were "meaningless 
in determining whether Defendant transacted business in Utah." 
(R. at 156). Because the documents were not authenticated or 
supported by affidavit, no further response was necessary as the 
documents carried no evidentiary weight. 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development, 659 P.2d 1040, 
1044 (Utah 1983), which plaintiff cites for the proposition that 
defendants have waived any evidentiary defects has nothing to do 
with the unsupported documents in the case at bar. Franklin 
stands for the proposition that on a summary judgment motion if 
an opposing party fails to move to strike defective affidavits, 
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he is deemed to waive any evidentiary defects. Franklin at 1044. 
In the case at bar, there were no affidavits of any kind, only 
unsupported documents. No motion to strike was necessary. The 
case at bar was not a motion for summary judgment, rather it was 
a motion to dismiss based on personal jurisdiction and as such, 
the motion to dismiss was being decided solely on the complaint 
and supporting exhibits. 
Even if the court determines that the correspondence should 
be considered in determining whether specific personal 
jurisdiction exists, these documents do not change the fact that 
defendant has not transacted business within the State of Utah 
nor do his actions have any nexus with the State of Utah. 
This is illustrated by a simple example from common 
experience. This case is exactly like the situation when a home 
owner makes mortgage payments to an out of state mortgage holder. 
The mortgage may be sold or assigned to other mortgage holders in 
other states. Regardless of where the mortgage is held, any 
action against the homeowner on the mortgage must be brought 
where the mortgagor resides as no other court would have 
jurisdiction. 
The same is true in the case at bar, payments and 
correspondence would have taken place regardless of what state 
the plaintiff happened to live in. Correspondence and payments 
do not magically create specific personal jurisdiction. 
In Far West Capital, Inc., vs Dorothy A. Towne and Fleetwood 
Corporation, 828 F. Supp 909 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Utah Cent. Div. 
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1993), which had facts in some ways similar to the case at bar, 
(ie. substantial correspondence) the court concluded that despite 
a three year negotiation process including numerous facsimile 
transmissions, mailings and phone calls between the parties, 
there was no nexus with the state sufficient to establish 
specific personal jurisdiction. The court stated: 
The Court concludes that the nature of such contacts when 
compared to the three year process of negotiations, much of 
which took place in person, is insufficient to satisfy the 
nexus requirement of Utah's long arm statute." 
In the case at bar the contacts illustrated by the correspondence 
were less intensive than in Far West, and took place over a span 
of approximately 15 years. Certainly no nexus was created under 
those circumstances. Without such a nexus, specific personal 
jurisdiction cannot exist. 
VI. DEFENDANTS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS WILL BE VIOLATED. 
The final requirement for determining whether or not 
specific personal jurisdiction exists is to determine whether 
requiring defendant to defend an action in a particular state 
comports with due process requirements. This is a two part 
analysis. The first part of the analysis is to determine whether 
the defendant purposely availed himself of the privilege of doing 
business in the forum state. The second part of the analysis is 
to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction satisfies the 
demands of fair play and substantial justice. The purpose behind 
this due process analysis is to ensure that a defendant can be 
required to defend an action outside his home state only "where 
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he should reasonable anticipate out of state litigation." STV, 
750 F. supp. at 1077. The contacts which the defendant has with 
the state must be "such that he should reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court there." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 
471 U.S. 462, 474, 85 L. Ed. 2d. 528, 105 S. Ct. 2174 (Quoting 
World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 44 U.S. at 297). 
Entering into a contract with a resident of a state, without 
more, is an insufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction 
within that state. Nicholas v. Buchanan, 806 F.2d 305, 307 (1st 
Cir. 1986). 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Kamdar set forth the 
requirements that must be met to satisfy a non-resident 
defendant's due process rights. The Court stated: 
In order to satisfy due process requirements, a defendant's 
contacts with Utah must be "such that maintenance of a suit 
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 158 (1945) (quoting 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 343 
(194 0)). Accordingly, the defendants must have "purposely 
availed" themselves of the privilege of conducting 
activities here, Anderson, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5. 
(quoting Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 
12287, 1240 (1958)), and they must have "reasonably 
anticipated being haled into court here." Id. (quoting 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 
100 S. Ct. 559, 567 (1980). We must also balance "the 
convenience of the parties and the interests of the State in 
assuming jurisdiction," Mallory Engineering v. Ted R. Brown 
& Assoc. . 618 P.@d 1004, 1008 (Utah 1980) (Citations 
omitted), by examining "the relationship of the defendant, 
the forum, and the litigation, to each other." Id. at 1007 
(citations omitted). 
One factor in determining whether or not a nonresident 
defendant has purposely availed himself of the privileges and 
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protections of the laws of a particular forum state requires 
inquiry into the nature of the relationship. 
Purposeful availment analysis turns upon whether the 
defendant contacts are attributable to his own actions or 
solely to the actions of the plaintiff. . . . [and 
generally] requires . . . affirmative conduct by the 
defendant which allows or promotes the transaction of 
business within the forum state. 
STV, 750 F. Supp. at 1078 (quoting Rambo Insurance Co., 839 F.2d 
1475, 1418,-19). 
In the case at bar, there are no actions attributable to the 
defendant set forth in the complaint or the accompanying exhibits 
in which he is alleged to have availed himself of the privilege 
of doing business in Utah. The only contacts the defendant has 
with Utah are completely coincidental, because the plaintiff 
happens to live in the State of Utah. Defendant has not 
purposely reached out of Colorado and done any act in Utah which 
would be sufficient for minimum contacts purposes. Because the 
complaint, or the accompanying documents completely fail to plead 
any purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business in 
Utah, personal jurisdiction based upon those documents cannot 
exist. 
Plaintiff may argue that defendant has purposely availed 
himself of the protection of the law of the State of Utah because 
he has contracted with a Utah resident. That was the position 
taken by the plaintiffs in Far West. In response to this 
position the court stated: 
To adopt plaintiffs' reasoning would essentially embrace a 
rule that the mere formation of a contract with a resident 
of another state automatically subjects the nonresident to 
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the jurisdiction if that other state. Such a rule would 
effectively eviscerate the due process requirement. 
Far West Capital, Inc., et al. , vs Dorothy A. Towne and Fleetwood 
Corporation 838 F. Supp. 909 (U.S. Dist. Ct. Utah Cent. Div. 
1993). 
The final analysis involves fair play and substantial 
justice. Respecting the fair play and substantial justice part 
of this analysis the United States Supreme Court has said: 
Courts . . . may evaluate the burden on the defendant, the 
forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the 
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective 
relief, the interstate judicial system's interest in 
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies. 
Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (Quoting World Wide Volkswagen Corp. 
v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 292). 
Plaintiff has not pled that defendant in this matter has any 
contacts with the State of Utah. Even the additional exhibits, 
which plaintiff argues the court should consider, only 
demonstrate payments and correspondence. The promissory note 
which underlies this matter was executed in Colorado. The 
secured real property is in Colorado. The personal guarantees 
upon which plaintiff is basing this action were executed by 
defendant in Colorado. The only contacts defendant had with the 
state of Utah involved sending payments and correspondence into 
the state over a 15 year course of dealing between the parties. 
Keeping in mind that the analysis looks at the actions of the 
defendant, not the plaintiff, there is nothing about the 
relationship between the parties which gives the Courts of the 
State of Utah specific personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
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If defendant is haled into court in Utah his due process rights 
will clearly be violated. 
Even if the court were to hold that the complaint and its 
accompanying exhibits along with the correspondence referred to 
by plaintiff demonstrate that defendant has contacts with the 
State of Utah, they are not of the quality required to find 
specific personal jurisdiction. 
. . . . Whether due process is satisfied must depend 
rather upon the quality and nature of the activity in 
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the 
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause 
to insure. 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington 326 U.S. 319, 316, 66 S. Ct. 
154, 158 (1945). 
Defendant has done nothing to specifically bring himself under 
the protection of the laws of the State of Utah. Any connection 
defendant has with the State of Utah is merely coincidental 
because plaintiff lives here. The personal guarantee which is 
the subject of this action was signed by plaintiff in Colorado, 
was based on real property in Colorado, and was intended to be 
performed in Colorado. There is no connection between this 
litigation and the State of Utah of the quality and nature that 
would allow the exercise of jurisdiction in this forum. The 
order of the trial court dismissing this matter must therefore be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The standard of review in this matter is a correctness 
standard as the case was decided based on documents. Because 
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there were no affidavits submitted by either side, the only 
documents which are properly before the court are the complaint 
and the exhibits which accompany it. Based on those documents, 
it is clear that defendant has not transacted business in Utah; 
that there is no nexus between the defendant, the forum and the 
litigation, and that the due process rights of the defendant are 
not being protected. 
Even if the correspondence submitted by plaintiff is 
considered, the required tests for finding specific personal 
jurisdiction have not been satisfied. Because those tests cannot 
be satisfied, the defendant cannot be required to defend this 
action in the State of Utah. Defendant therefore respectfully 
requests that the decision of the trial court dismissing this 
action for lack of personal jurisdiction be affirmed. 
DATED THIS <5ffi( day of February, 1995. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND P.C. 
J." GRANT MOODY^T? 
DONALD E. McCANDLESS 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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78-27-22. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Purpose of 
provision. 
It is declared, as a matter of legislative determination, that the public 
interest demands the state provide its citizens with an effective means of 
redress against nonresident persons, who, through certain significant mini-
mal contacts with this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's 
protection. This legislative action is deemed necessary because of technologi-
cal progress which has substantially increased the flow of commerce between 
the several states resulting in increased interaction between persons of this 
state and persons of other states. 
The provisions of this act, to ensure maximum protection to citizens of this 
state, should be applied so as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
APPENDIX 2 
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78-27-23. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) The words "any person" mean any individual, firm, company, asso-
ciation, or corporation. 
(2) The words "transaction of business within this state" mean activi-
ties of a nonresident person, his agents, or representatives in this state 
which affect persons or businesses within the state of Utah. 
APPENDIX 3 
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78*27*24. Jurisdiction over nonresidents — Acts submit-
ting person to jurisdiction. 
Any person, notwithstanding Section 16-10a-1501, whether or not a citizen 
or resident of this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the 
foUowing enumerated acts, submits himself, and if an individual, his personal 
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any claim 
arising from: 
(1) the transaction of any business within this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or goods in this state; 
(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether tortious or by 
breach of warranty; 
(4) the ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this 
state; 
(5) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within 
this state at the time of contracting; 
(6) with respect to actions of divorce, separate maintenance, or child 
support, having resided, in the marital relationship, within this state 
notwithstanding subsequent departure from the state; or the commission 
in this state of the act giving rise to the claim, so long as that act is not a 
mere omission, failure to act, or occurrence over which the defendant had 
no control; or 
(7) the commission of sexual intercourse within this state which gives 
rise to a paternity suit under Title 78, Chapter 45a, to determine paternity 
for the purpose of establishing responsibility for child support. 
APPENDIX 4 
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Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) When presented. A defendant shall serve his answer within twenty 
days after the service of the summons and complaint is complete unless other-
wise expressly provided by statute or order of the court. A party served with a 
pleading stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto 
within twenty days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his 
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the 
answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service 
of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under 
this rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed 
by order of the court: 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten 
days after notice of the court's action; 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of 
the more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permit-
ted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further plead-
ing after the denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for 
relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judg-
ment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d> Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot 
reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, he may move for a 
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading. The mo-
tion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the 
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days 
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the 
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such 
order as it deems just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon 
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense 
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this 
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available 
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein 
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
